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Miles Goodwin and Glenda Maconachie 
The regulatory enforcement literature proposes a continuum with two principal 
perspectives to gaining compliance with regulations at its extremes – a 
compliance approach and a deterrence approach. Within these perspectives a 
range of strategies and tools are used to support the broad intent of an 
enforcement agency. One tool is the inspection blitz, concentrating resources 
where significant non-compliance is suspected. While agencies enforcing 
minimum labour standards in the Australian federal jurisdiction have traditionally 
used the blitz strategy as an occasional tool, it is now more regularly used. This 
paper examines the blitz as an enforcement tool, placing it within the 
compliance/deterrence perspectives, before exploring its use by the Workplace 
Ombudsman/Fair Work Ombudsman. We argue that multiple factors have led to 
the blitz’s redesign in the post-Work Choices environment, and that its current 
framework and persuasive compliance nature is not appropriate for all situations. 
The ultimate formal goal of a regulatory agency is to induce compliance with the regulations 
for which it is responsible. In the past few decades various studies have examined the manner 
in which the law and legal sanctions are utilised in the control of business and industrial 
behaviour.  They have, in the main, shown that regulatory/enforcement agency officials tend 
to adopt a range of common formal enforcement practices as well as a range of more informal 
techniques including education, advice and persuasion. One aspect addressed in terms of 
approaches to enforcement highlights the extent to which a sanction-oriented approach is 
undertaken by a regulatory agency. A continuum has been suggested, with agencies and 
officials with legalistic or sanction-oriented approaches (generally termed the deterrence 
model) represented at one extreme and, at the other, those adopting a conciliatory or 
accommodative approach (generally termed the compliance model) (Hawkins & Thomas 
1984; Hutter 1989; Braithwaite et al 1987; Freiberg 2002). It should be noted that as a result 
of labelling this model as ‘the compliance model’, the term ‘compliance’ is used in two 
senses. In accordance with the literature it is used as a model title to signal a particular 
(softer) approach to enforcement in contrast to the ‘deterrence model’ which is used to 
indicate a more legalistic sanctioned-oriented enforcement model. Secondly, ‘compliance’ is 
also used in its more natural sense which, in the context of this paper, refers to regulatees 
acting in accordance with regulatory requirements.  
This paper explores the compliance and deterrence models of enforcement, before focusing 
on one tool in an enforcement agency’s arsenal, the inspection blitz. Traditional means of 
using an inspection blitz are explored, as are the advantages and disadvantages of blitzes, 
before their use in the arena of minimum labour standards enforcement by the Workplace 
Ombudsman/Fair Work Ombudsman (WO/FWO) in the Australian federal context for the 
period July 2006 to September 2009 is examined. While enforcement agencies have been 
largely identified in the literature as espousing the conciliatory approach of the compliance 
model, the blitz has traditionally been one technique that could be identified as a deterrence 
weapon. Its most recent usage by the WO/FWO however, highlights a significant redesign of 
many of its characteristics such that most if not all of its deterrent value has been eliminated. 
Compliance and deterrence models: the basics 
Situating an enforcement agency on the continuum between compliance and deterrence 
approaches to enforcement requires the consideration of two enforcement activities. The first 
is the manner in which officials uncover and evaluate whether a particular act or omission 
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breaches regulatory objectives. This detection strategy determines whether strict proactive 
monitoring or broad observation techniques are used for breach discovery, and whether rules 
are interpreted and applied in a legalistic fashion or applied in a more flexible, lenient 
manner. The second activity concerns the action taken against the offender once a breach has 
been determined. The rectification/prosecution strategy adopted by agencies differs according 
to their location on the continuum. Taking immediate action, issuing violation notices, 
applying fines or starting prosecution proceedings would be identified with the deterrence 
end. Affording offenders a second (or repeated) chance(s) to comply, providing advice on 
how objectives could be met, or even entering into negations where one breach may be 
ignored if another is swiftly rectified would be characteristic of the compliance end. 
A binary model of enforcement based on these ideas is outlined in Table 1 (Goodwin 2004).  
Table 1 
 
STRATEGY ORIENTED ENFORCEMENT CONTINUUM 
 
 Compliance Model 
 
 Deterrence Model 
 
Detection Strategy 
 Flexible interpretation of regulatory 
standards 
 Non-legalistic and non-adversarial 
 Monitoring techniques based on broad 




 Strict legalistic interpretation of regulatory 
standards 
 Legalistic and accusatory 
 Monitoring techniques search for specific            





 Negotiated compliance with trade-offs 
 Improvement notices/warnings/threats 
 Compliance viewed as long term goal 
 Prosecution as last resort in order to induce 
compliance 
- if compliance demonstrated prior to court 
case legal action suspended or withdrawn 




 Limited use of warnings and threats 
 When formal improvement notices issued 
they are first stage of prosecution process 
 Bargaining only occurs publicly in court 
 Prosecution most common response with 
twin objectives of punishment for violation 
and general deterrent which promotes 
compliance 
 Number of prosecutions used as a positive 
performance indicator 
While the underlying purpose of both models is to ensure compliance with regulations, how 
they attempt to achieve this goal differs markedly because the models have opposing views 
on socio-cultural causality. The compliance model advocates remedying current breaches 
and preventing future breaches by concentrating on the underlying problems in a non-
adversarial manner, without the need for detection and subsequent prosecution of violators. 
Enforcement officials will generally adopt a lengthy, private bargaining process which may 
involve incremental adjustments leading to conformity, or even tradeoffs where one violation 
is overlooked in the short term for immediate action on another, more serious breach (Hutter 
1989; Riess 1984).  
As the remedy to a given situation often involves the expenditure of both time and money by 
the company, there is an underlying axiom that conformity is a long-term goal which may not 
be immediately achievable. The compliance model presumes that causal conditions can be 
manipulated to prevent violations, if knowledge of the underlying problems is recognised and 
dealt with (Riess 1984:25-6). Thus, the compliance approach is essentially premonitory in 
nature, focusing more on prevention techniques and less on breach detection techniques. It 
places less emphasis on detection strategies, employs a flexible attitude in determining what 
constitutes a breach and uses a series of techniques to rectify the situation prior to considering 
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prosecution (Hutter 1989; Hawkins and Thomas 1984; Riess 1984; Black 2001). 
The deterrence model on the other hand, seeks to ensure conformity with regulations by 
adopting a legalistic approach to the detection of breaches and, having established 
responsibility, initiates prosecutions to punish the violators.  This approach to enforcement: is 
both accusatory and adversarial in nature; places a priority on detection strategies; is 
routinely reliant on formal legal prosecutions; and any bargaining usually takes place publicly 
within a court of law (Hutter 1989; Hawkins & Thomas 1984; Black 2001). Being post-
monitory in nature (with a detected breach necessary to start the enforcement process), the 
model has a backward looking aspect, with enforcement officials reacting to breaches that 
have occurred with the aim of punishing violators as a means of retribution and of deterring 
future violations.  
However, the extent to which this approach will discourage future violations is a moot point. 
Black (2001) argues that while future compliance may be a by-product of this approach, the 
central motivation is to secure punishment (for retribution or broader utilitarian purposes). 
Conversely, Riess (1984) suggests that the deterrence model presumes that sanctions will 
discourage future violations. Penalties imposed on a violator are assumed to deter both 
further breaches by the prosecuted offender and other potential violators.  
Although both models incorporate penalties, they are a primary ingredient of the deterrence 
model which actively seeks to punish violators for their wrongdoings. The compliance model 
will defer the imposition of penalties to induce compliance and, if compliance is subsequently 
demonstrated, will suspend or withdraw penalties. When sanctions are used in the compliance 
model it is perceived as a signal that the agency has failed in its attempts to secure 
conformity, whereas in the deterrence model the number of prosecutions is often used as a 
positive performance indicator. The manner in which penalties are used serves to highlight 
the disparate conceptions of regulatory enforcement between the two models. The 
compliance model simply seeks to ensure conformity with regulations whilst the deterrence 
model demands retribution in addition to conformity (Hutter 1989; Hawkins and Thomas 
1984; Riess 1989).  
This distinction also results from a different perception of human behaviour. A deterrence 
approach inflicts punishment to influence the rational behaviour of actors perceived to have 
considered the costs and benefits of compliance, while the persuasion of the compliance 
approach ‘presumes people to be reasonable, of good faith, and motivated to heed advice’ 
(Braithwaite 1985:79). Black (2001:10) suggests that the likelihood of prosecution being used 
depends on the ‘relational distance’ between the enforcement official and the regulated firm – 
the greater the distance the greater the use of prosecution, and vice versa. Measurements of 
relational distance include ‘the scope, frequency and duration of interactions between people, 
the age of their relationship, and the nature and number of links between them in a social 
network’ (Black 2001:10). For example, the deterrence model is dominant where 
wrongdoings are relatively unpredictable acts or incidents, offering limited opportunity for 
the enforcement official and the lawbreaker to develop personal relationships. Violations in 
this context are usually distinct, categorical acts or omissions. Once a violation has occurred, 
the official will attempt to charge the violator for subsequent punishment. Conversely, the 
compliance model tends to be associated with an environment of relatively stable regulatees 
which facilitates the development of a relationship between the official and the ‘client.’ 
Enforcement officials may then actively intervene and attempt to stop a potential violation 
from occurring. It is assumed that this more amicable relationship will not only make the 
official’s job easier but also assists in detecting existing violations and improving future 
compliance (Hawkins and Thomas 1984; Riess 1989).  
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Although both models are able to deal with violations, the manner in which they are 
identified and dealt with are distinct. The manner adopted is influenced by perceptions about 
core violations. In the deterrence model core violations constitute behaviour that is 
considered immediately harmful, and mobilisation depends on monitoring techniques that 
search for these violations. A core violation in the compliance model represents a 
transgression of a condition or standard designed to prevent harm. As the compliance model 
relies on broader observation of the overall condition of the processes under regulation and 
the propensity for conformity with regulation, core violations are often perceived as technical 
violations (Riess 1989:25).  
Hutter (1988; 1989:154-156) identified subtle differences in approach within the compliance 
model which she termed persuasive and insistence compliance strategies (see Table 2). The 
persuasive compliance strategy relies on an accommodative approach and adopts a range of 
informal tactics such as education and various forms of persuasion to establish conformity 
with the regulations. Underpinning the strategy is the idea that conformity is an opened 
ended, long-term proposition requiring a high degree of patience and understanding on the 
part of the enforcement official. While sharing this general approach, the insistence 
compliance strategy is less sympathetic towards violators and adopts clearly defined 
tolerance limits. Officials employ a similar range of tactics to gain conformity but expect 
relatively quick responses to requests, and will initiate legal action if the violator chooses to 
remain recalcitrant. Hutter (1989:156) stresses that, unlike the deterrence model, this strategy 
does not use legal action to gain conformity with regulations as a retribution for wrongdoing.  
Subsequently, if the offender rectifies the breach prior to the court hearing the action is 
usually dropped. Thus the form of legal action provides more flexibility than that adopted in 
the deterrence model.  This strategy falls between the two classifications of the binary model 
discussed above and forms part of an ‘empirically significant middle ground,’ providing 
enforcement officials with a flexible approach to ensure conformity, but within defined 
boundaries.   
Table 2 
STRATEGY ORIENTED ENFORCEMENT CONTINUUM 
Compliance Model Variants 
Persuasive-Compliance Variant Insistent-Compliance Variant 
Detection Strategy 
 As per Table 1 but with a more lenient 
approach to regulatory interpretation 
Detection Strategy 
 While remaining non-legalistic as per Table 
1, a more stringent interpretation of 
regulation is applied 
 Not as sympathetic towards violator. 
Rectification/Prosecution Strategy 
 Focus on education and advice 
 View that obtaining compliance is a long 
term objective requiring patience & 
understanding 
 Prosecutions extremely rare 
Rectification/Prosecution Strategy 
 Education & advice used but more reliance 
on techniques such as improvement notices, 
warning & threats 
 Expectation of relatively speedy compliance 
 Clearly defined tolerance limits & 
recalcitrants can expect to be prosecuted. 
Hutter (1989:156) argues that the two strategies can be distinguished by their interpretation of 
regulatory requirements and the propensity to initiate legal action. The persuasive strategy is 
much more flexible in respect of the regulatory interpretation and much less likely to resort to 
legal action. Although the insistence strategy is more stringent in its interpretation and use of 
legal processes than the persuasive strategy, it remains firmly within the parameters of the 
compliance model. Given the general agreement within the literature that most enforcement 
agencies adopt a compliance type strategy, Hutter’s (1988; 1989) research enables distinctive 
sub-sets to be identified, allowing for a more precise analysis within that broad enforcement 
type (Black 2001:4-5). 
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Enforcement of minimum labour standards in Australia 
The ultimate formal objective of an enforcement agency is to ensure observance of the 
regulations for which it is responsible. Any enforcement approach requires the use of tools 
and strategies to carry out those objectives. The regulatory agency tasked with monitoring 
and enforcing minimum labour standards in the Australian federal industrial relations 
jurisdiction is currently the Fair Work Ombudsman. 'Minimum labour standards' describe 
minimum wages and working conditions as established through Australian legislation, or 
through legally binding industrial tribunal determinations, awards, and industrial agreements 
of any particular employment relationship.  
In terms of detection tools and strategies, traditionally the Australian federal enforcement 
agency for minimum labour standards relied on regular, routine physical inspections of 
workplaces and records to ensure compliance with regulations (Maconachie & Goodwin 
2006). This practice achieved a measure of deterrence. Since the late 1970s this practice has 
fluctuated, interspersed with complaints-based systems, sampling techniques, telephone 
inspections, and reliance on trade union enforcement powers (Goodwin & Maconachie 2007). 
These changes have been reflective of changed political environments and influences, the 
shift from a centralised to de-centralised industrial relations system, and resourcing and 
personnel factors. They have also been representative of a shift from a deterrence approach to 
a compliance approach (Goodwin & Maconachie 2008). 
In terms of its rectification/prosecution strategy the agency has (with a slight deviation in the 
Whitlam years) tended to favour voluntary rectification except in the most serious or blatant 
of cases (Goodwin & Maconachie 2008).  This is continued with the agency’s current policy. 
The FWO litigation policy (http://www.fwo.gov.au/Legal-info-and-action/Guidance-
notes/Documents/GN-1-FWO-Litigation-Policy.pdf) provides valuable insight into how it 
supports the agency’s ‘broader compliance system’ by combining a range of ‘positive 
motivators and deterrents’ to encourage compliance. A raft of enforcement measures can be 
drawn upon to secure compliance, ranging from a letter of caution or small claims referral for 
‘minor’ breaches, to compliance notices, enforceable undertakings or litigation for more 
serious transgressions. Compliance notices are limited to employer breaches and direct the 
wrongdoer to rectify the effects of the breach and/or to produce evidence of compliance with 
the notice. If these requirements are not met within prescribed timeframes the FWO can be 
expected to initiate court proceedings seeking both remedies for the breaches as well as 
penalties. An enforceable undertaking provides an additional alternative to litigation and is 
aimed at focussing the wrongdoer on the actual tasks required to remedy the contravention 
and to prevent similar situations arising in the future. Hence the wrongdoer must admit to the 
breach, agree to undertake the specified remedy and acknowledge that failure to comply will 
probably lead to court action. The undertaking can also include a range of commitments such 
as regular audits and compliance plans, payment plans for underpayments and training for 
managers and staff. 
When considering whether or not to litigate the FWO adopts a two-stage process: first, 
sufficient evidence to prosecute must exist; and, second, the litigation must be in the public 
interest. With regard to the first step, the FWO will examine whether a prima facie case can 
be made against the wrongdoer and that a reasonable prospect exists for winning the 
litigation. The second aspect of the test, public interest is a more complicated issues, 
requiring the FWO to consider the: nature and circumstances of the alleged contravention; 
characteristics of the alleged wrongdoer; level of public concern; impact of the contravention; 
deterrence value; effect of litigation; and administrative issues. Where it is determined that 
litigation is not the appropriate enforcement mechanism the enforcement measures outlined 
above come into consideration. 
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The minimum labour standards enforcement agency in Australia is, as the literature suggests 
of all enforcement agencies, more likely to take an accommodative or compliance approach 
overall when attempting to gain compliance with aspects of the regulations under their 
control. To examine how the apparently increasing importance of an accommodative 
approach may be impacting on specific enforcement tools, the paper now examines the use of 
the inspection blitz. 
Minimum labour standards enforcement and the inspection blitz 
Despite changes outlined above in terms of detection strategies, one tool which has always 
been in the agency’s enforcement arsenal is the inspection blitz. An inspection blitz is an 
enforcement technique used by a regulatory agency to concentrate its resources on a 
particular area, industry or issues where significant non-compliance is suspected. When used 
traditionally as an enforcement instrument in the Australian federal industrial relations 
jurisdiction, the blitz was characterised as an unannounced, ‘surprise visit’ by inspectors 
simultaneously investigating compliance with industrial instruments in multiple workplaces 
in an area, or within an industry.  The element of surprise had two outcomes: it did not 
provide unscrupulous employers with the opportunity to ‘cook’ the books or suspend or sack 
underpaid employees (Bennett 1994:155); and allowed a clear picture of compliance levels to 
be identified. The blitz has typically been used as an occasional tool designed to achieve 
maximum deterrent effect for minimum resource expenditure.  
Both positive and negative consequences emerge for any enforcement agency using the blitz 
strategy. As the level of non-compliance uncovered by a blitz is usually significant, wide and 
sensational publicity often follows, providing prospects for both education and deterrence. 
The level of publicity affects both workers and employers. Workers become more aware of 
their entitlements, and inquiries to the agency increase dramatically immediately after the 
blitz. It also helps in securing voluntary compliance by employers, or where employers are 
genuinely ignorant of their responsibilities, motivates inquiries to ensure compliance (UK 
Department of Employment 1977:108). There are however, three key disadvantages resulting 
from the publicity generated by an enforcement blitz. First, routine inspections of industries 
not suited to the blitz strategy can be neglected. Second, as additional post-blitz resources are 
usually not forthcoming the agency is overwhelmed with inquires and complaints, resulting 
in a backlog of work generated by a small component of their overall responsibility. Finally, 
the publicity generated by the blitz strategy is unsustainable. As sensationalism decreases 
with each blitz campaign the media interest quickly dissipates (UK Department of 
Employment 1977:108-9), reducing both the educational and deterrent effects. 
The ‘modern’ blitz and the WO/FWO 
The inspection blitz has undergone a significant redesign since 2006, in terminology, 
implementation and usage. Now called the ‘targeted campaign,’ it appears to have become 
the primary strategic proactive tool for the Workplace Ombudsman/ Fair Work Ombudsman, 
used more regularly than in the past. The WO is ‘committed to conducting four national 
campaigns annually with each state undertaking a further two state-based campaigns per 
year’ (Office of Workplace Ombudsman [OWO] 2008:14). Each of these campaigns/blitzes 
is preceded by an industry-wide education phase before inspectors approach a workplace. 
Much emphasis is placed on ‘engaging with the relevant stakeholders’ and allowing them to 
comment or assist with the education phase of the campaign (OWO 2008:15). The targeted 
campaign is considered an ‘effective strategy for lifting the profile of the Workplace 
Ombudsman, educating the community and ensuring compliance with federal workplace 
laws’ (OWO 2008:17). 
One such targeted campaign was the National Young Workers Campaign by the Workplace 
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Ombudsman. The timing of the campaign suggests it was conducted in response to adverse 
publicity generated by Work Choices legislation and the use of Australian Workplace 
Agreements. Following media allegations of exploitation of vulnerable workers, especially 
young workers, approval for the campaign was given in August 2006 and commenced in 
February 2007 (OWO 2007). The campaign’s objectives of ‘ensuring employers understand 
and comply with their obligations’, ‘educate and inform young people about their rights, 
‘provide sources of information and support around compliance with employment terms and 
conditions’ and ‘identify problem industries to assist with determining target groups for 
future campaigns’ (OWO 2007, National Young Workers Campaign:1) were clearly more 
associated with the compliance approach than the deterrence approach. Stakeholders 
including the Building Service Contractors Association of Australia, the Australian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (and its state and territory affiliates), Employers First, and the 
Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union were informed prior to the campaign 
commencing. 
The campaign leveraged off an amnesty for employers on time and wage records, which had 
sought to educate and seek compliance in terms of these requirements. After 3500 
information packs had been distributed to employers, an industry-wide mail-out of fact sheets 
occurred. This was followed by specific letters to 399 employers targeted for the campaign 
requesting time and wage records, and pay slips for all employees for a four week period in 
January 2007. Even with this level of notification, 41% of employers were found to be in 
breach. Breaches related predominantly to wages and weekend penalty rates, with the retail 
trade, accommodation and food serves industry sectors the primary offenders (OWO 2007, 
National Young Workers Campaign:1-5). A total of $475,546 was recovered for workers 
through voluntary rectification. Despite the high levels of non-compliance no litigation was 
undertaken, but further education activity in the industries covered by the blitz was favoured.  
A more recent campaign, the National Hospitality Campaign, completed in March 2009, 
followed a similar process. Prior to the campaign, information such as relevant articles, 
newsletters and web links were provided to 28 stakeholders  including the Australian Hotels 
Association, Hotels, Motels and Accommodation Association, Restaurant and Catering 
Association and Clubs NSW. Meetings were conducted with several stakeholders, and 
between March and June 2008, following consultation and information sessions with the WO, 
the Australian Hotels Association provided their members with the opportunity to self audit 
using a checklist developed in collaboration with the WO. In August 2008 over 7880 
educative letters were mailed to employers in the hospitality sectors selected in each state 
(www.fwo.gov.au).  
Following the educative mail out, a random selection of employers was targeted for a 
compliance audit which consisted of a written request for them to provide time and wage 
records and other information for a specified two week period including a public holiday 
(www.fwo.gov.au). Where employers were found to be non-compliant workplace inspectors 
conducted further investigations as appropriate. Of 705 targeted employers, 571 compliance 
audits were conducted, with a 67% compliance rate in terms of the parameters of the audit 
(www.fwo.gov.au). Interestingly, although only a small number of employers in the 
accommodation industry sector (which intersected with the earlier National Young Workers 
Campaign of 2007) were targeted, their compliance rate was found to be 30%. While not 
providing sufficient data to draw definitive conclusions, this suggests that the approach taken 
(at least in this sector) is not having the effect of changing behaviour that the WO desires. 
Like the National Young Workers’ campaign, the National Hospitality campaign uncovered 
breaches in terms of the provision of payslips, payment of wages and loadings such as 
weekend and public holiday rates. Recovery of unpaid wages to the sum of $717,253 resulted 
Goodwin and Maconachie 
through voluntary rectification. Again no litigation was undertaken by the WO 
(www.fwo.gov.au). 
Discussion and conclusions 
The traditional use of the blitz as an enforcement tool has been both educational and as a 
deterrent to non-compliance. There are five significant differences between the traditional 
blitz and its modern counterpart the ‘targeted campaign.’ Each is discussed with its pros and 
cons explored. These do not constitute an exhaustive account of pros and cons, but highlight 
potential consequences of these differences. First, it is no longer a ‘physical visit’. Rather 
than an inspector arriving unannounced at the organisation to inspect its records, and 
interview the employer and employees as necessary, the ‘targeted campaign’ depends on a 
‘paper’ inspection. Only if non-compliance is found (and it is assumed that the evidence must 
show either non-compliance across a large proportion of employees or be found consistently 
in terms of specific conditions) will the inspector undertake a physical inspection and conduct 
a complete audit.  
Pros:  Inevitably a blitz campaign draws in organisations and employers that are not in the 
jurisdiction of the enforcement agency or are not covered by the industrial instrument being 
investigated (if it is a specifically targeted at a particular industrial instrument such as an 
award). Having employers provide their records, rather than the inspector travelling to each 
organisation saves time – the inspector can determine jurisdiction, industrial instrument and 
assess terms and conditions quickly and clearly. This can also be conducted without the 
inspector being in a potentially ‘hostile’ environment, and with few interruptions. 
Cons: There is no evidence that the documents provided to the inspectors are the ‘real’ 
documents, or that they cover all employees. Depending on the level of notice provided by 
the educational phase, employers may have the opportunity to put off some staff for the 
period (for example, if they have not been paying them correctly) and then take them back on 
when the blitz is over.  
Second, it focuses on a snapshot of targeted organisations’ activities. The targeted campaign 
has limited parameters, in terms of the time frame, the range of issues explored or the 
industrial instrument examined.  
Pros: If the parameters of the campaign take into account all ‘big ticket’ items of non-
compliance such as wages, leave loadings, penalty rates and so forth, three possible outcomes 
will be discovered: compliance across all terms and conditions; a picture of consistent non-
compliance across all or some terms and conditions; or isolated instances of non-compliance 
possibly indicative of confusion or error. 
Cons: These snapshots of an organisation’s activities in terms of compliance with minimum 
labour standards may highlight some issues of concern, but they may completely ignore other 
areas in which systematic non-compliance is occurring. Equally, if the employer is able to 
‘cook the books’ for the short period covered by the campaign, considerable non-compliance 
over an extended period may be undiscovered. The focus on a specific industrial instrument 
(rather than whichever industrial instrument is in operation at the organisation) may also 
result in non-compliance being overlooked. 
Third, the targeted campaign has done away with the element of surprise, favouring broad 
involvement of multiple stakeholders at every opportunity. This approach favours advance 
notice, either to individual employers or through joint, cooperative campaigns with employer 
and/or industry organisations. It is therefore more compatible with the compliance approach 
than the deterrence approach to enforcement.  
Pros: In instances such as that outlined above for the National Young Workers’ campaign, 
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where the campaign is commenced to ensure compliance with significant government policy 
changes (or in reaction to adverse publicity about government policy), the visibility of the 
campaign is explicable.  
Cons: Use of such visibility and broad stakeholder consultation as a continuing strategy is 
certain to be inappropriate in some situations and increasingly ineffective in many others – 
especially in the longer term. Continuing to use the same ‘persuasive compliance’ strategy for 
all situations and circumstances, even when the sector being targeted has been the subject of 
previous campaigns, may well lead to complacency on the part of the regulated and little 
effort to be compliant with the regulations. 
Fourth, the organisations actually audited in the campaign constitute a very small sample of 
the organisations in the sector targeted. 
Pros: If the object of the campaign is primarily educational with the emphasis being placed 
on the mail outs and stakeholder liaison, then the minority actually audited merely provide a 
gauge to compliance levels in the sector or region, requiring further activities by the FWO. 
Cons: The samples selected may not be representative of compliance in the sector or region, 
giving a false impression to the FWO (either positive or negative). If the object of the 
campaign is both educational and deterrent in nature, the small sample size and the emphasis 
on voluntary rectification provides very little in the way of deterrence for the vast majority of 
employers. 
Fifth, few prosecutions have eventuated from targeted campaigns. Regardless of the breaches 
uncovered or the level of non-compliance within a targeted organisation, prosecutions are 
rare, as is the recorded use of compliance notices or enforceable undertakings.  
Pros: The targeted campaigns appear to place a great premium on education, building 
cooperation with employers and their representatives, and raising the profile of the agency. 
The volatile industrial relations climate since Work Choices makes these necessary activities. 
Cons: If the campaign has both educational and deterrence aspects, the use of tools other than 
voluntary rectification is important. Continual adoption of a persuasive compliance approach 
in campaigns, once it becomes known that voluntary rectification is the worst outcome of 
being caught, may prove to be counterproductive in the longer term. Additionally, such 
campaigns may not be sustainable over the longer term as education reaches saturation point.  
Overall the WFO litigation policy, in particular sections 3.4 (Role of FWO) and 4 (Litigation 
as a compliance tool), and the design of the blitz campaigns, firmly place the FWO on the 
compliance end of the strategy orientated enforcement continuum. The persuasive 
compliance variant is highlighted in relation to breaches uncovered during a blitz. A possible 
explanation for this is that as the targeted campaigns are focused on education the FWO feels 
that prosecutions will have a detrimental effect on any goodwill developed during with 
stakeholders. 
While critical of the new version of the inspection blitz, we are cognisant of the environment 
within which the WO/FWO has been operating for the last few years. The industrial relations 
system in Australia has been in a state of flux since the introduction of the Work Choices 
amendments to the Workplace Relations Act in 2005, followed by its replacement by the Fair 
Work Act in 2009. The shift of many employers from the state to a new federal system, the 
varying use and conditions of disadvantage/fairness tests in relation to agreements, the use of 
transition industrial instruments, and the steady decline of trade union density and subsequent 
enforcement coverage of workers, has left the industrial inspectorate exposed to great 
uncertainty and even greater workloads. The reliance on education and voluntary rectification 
in this environment is understandable, as is the redesign of the inspection blitz to achieve 
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compliance outcomes. Our main concern is that using this tool, in the same manner in all 
situations, is not appropriate for follow-up blitzes or in the longer term, and provides no point 
of differentiation between organisations (large/small; with HR/IR sections or without; new 
award/agreement or continuing conditions; unionised/non-unionised and so forth). As such, 
the deterrent value of the traditional blitz has been eliminated in the targeted campaign. 
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